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Concerning Preemption: Upholding
Consent Under the Federal
Arbitration Act
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion'
I. INTRODUCTION
State and federal governments have long been at odds regarding the applica-
tion of arbitration clauses in private contractual agreements. Congress, aware of
such disdain by the states to enforce arbitration, created the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA) in 1925 to curtail state efforts to illegitimize arbitration. 2 Unable to
entirely invalidate arbitration agreements after the enactment of the FAA, state
legislatures attempted to regulate such agreements instead. One of the newest
forms of state regulation to test the preemptive power of the FAA is the use of
state law to require the availability of class-wide arbitration in arbitration agree-
ments.4
Concepcion represents the latest failed effort by a state to assert some level of
control over consensual arbitration agreements. It also represents an affirmation
by the U.S. Supreme Court of a long-standing notion that arbitration agreements,
standing on equal footing with other contracts, must be enforced according to their
terms-holding consent to be the paramount consideration in judicial analysis.5
This note will examine the lengthy history of the FAA's preemptive power under
the Supremacy Clause, explore the U.S. Supreme Court's time-honored rationale
for choosing when to exercise its preemptive powers to invalidate state law, and
evaluate potential implications resulting from the Supreme Court's recent decision
to preempt state law efforts to invalidate class-action waiver provisions found in
arbitration agreements.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 2002, AT&T Mobility LLC began advertising a range of "free" and sub-
stantially discounted phones to customers who also purchased one of its service
1. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
2. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1984); see also H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1
(1924).
3. The Supreme Court has permitted state regulation of arbitration clauses where they operate
under "general contract law principles." Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281
(1995) ("States may regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under general contract law prin-
ciples and they may invalidate an arbitration clause 'upon such grounds as exists at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract"' (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2011))).
4. See, e.g., Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
5. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748-49. See also Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989) ("Arbitration under the [FAA] in [sic] a matter of consent,
not coercion, and parties are generally free to structure arbitration agreements as they see fit").
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plans.6 These advertisements contained fine print language indicating customers
would be responsible for sales tax and other applicable charges. Under the terms
of the offer, customers would be required to pay a sales tax between 6% and 28%
of the phone's suggested retail value, despite such phones being advertised as
either "free" or discounted.
Enticed by AT&T's advertisements, customers Liza and Vincent Concepcion
purchased two phones from AT&T and signed a two-year service agreement. 9 The
first phone was reduced by one hundred dollars ($100), while the second phone
was free-of-charge.10 As part of that sale, the Concepcions were charged an addi-
tional $30.22 in sales tax-an amount reflecting taxation on the full suggested
retail value of the first phone and not on the price of the phone deducted by a one
hundred dollar ($100) discount. "
The service agreement included language requiring arbitration for all disputes
arising between the parties.12 An important term of the arbitration clause was a
class waiver provision requiring claims to be bilaterally arbitrated between the
Concepcions and AT&T, with no rights to arbitrate as a class-action proceeding.' 3
An amended version of the service agreement provided a number of favorable
provisions to the Concepcions should they elect to arbitrate a claim against
AT&T.14
Rather than pursing their claims through arbitration, the Concepcions filed a
complaint against AT&T in the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of California in March 2 0 0 6 .s The Concepcions argued AT&T had engaged
in false advertising practices and had committed fraud by charging its customers a
sales tax on phones it advertised as free or discounted.'6 This complaint was even-
tually consolidated into an already-pending class action in September 2006.'1 In
6. Brief for Appellee at 4, Concepcion v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (2009) (No. 08-
56394), 2009 WL 2494187.
7. Id. at 3. Such language included: "taxes and other charges additional," "sales tax applies to the
retail value of the phone," "sales tax based upon MSRP of all phones," and "[slome restrictions apply.
See store for details." Id.
8. Id
9. Id. at 4.
10. Id.
11. Id. ("The Concepcions were charged $30.22 in sales tax, equal to 7.75% of $399.98 and not the
discounted amount actually charged"). Id.
12. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744.
13. Id. The contract provided "for arbitration of all disputes between the parties ... [on an] individu-
al capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class or representative proceeding."
Id. (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. 61a.)
14. These favorable provisions included the following: 1.) AT&T is required to pay all costs for
non-frivolous claims; 2.) Arbitration must take place in the county where customer is billed; 3.) Claims
worth $10,000 or less may proceed in arbitration by phone, in person, or based solely upon submis-
sions, at the customer's sole preference; 4.) Either party may bring a claim in small claims court rather
than in arbitration; 5.) The arbitrator may award any form of relief, including punitive damages and
injunctions; 6.) AT&T may not seek attorney's fees; and 7.) In the event a customer receives arbitra-
tion awards greater than the amount offered in settlement by AT&T, AT&T must pay a $7,500 mini-
mum including twice the amount of the claimant's attorney's fees. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744.
15. Id.
16. Id
17. Liza and Vincent Concepcion filed their original class action complaint on March 27, 2006. On
May 25, 2006, AT&T filed a motion to consolidate the Concepcions' case with another case entitled
Laster v. T-Mobilc. 407 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (S.D. Cal. 2005). AT&T and T-Mobile were co-defendants
[Vol. 2012282
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response, AT&T moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the class waiver provi-
sion of the service agreement.' 8 Although the district court favored the language
of the service agreement's arbitration clause, it ultimately found the clause to be
unconscionable because AT&T failed to show that "bilateral arbitration adequate-
ly substituted for the deterrent effects of class actions."' 9 Relying on the California
Supreme Court's decision in Discover Bank v. Superior Court20-holding uncon-
scionable any consumer contract of adhesion which includes a class-action waiver
clause where disputes would foreseeably involve small amounts of damage and
the party with superior bargaining power is alleged to have carried out a scheme to
deliberately cheat the consumer-the district court denied AT&T's motion to
compel arbitration.2 1
Upon review, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's
ruling, finding Discover Bank to be dispositive.22 It also rejected a claim by
AT&T that the Discover Bank rule was preempted by § 2 of the FAA,23 making
all arbitration agreements "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 24 The
Ninth Circuit found the Discover Bank rule was not preempted because it did not
stand as an obstacle to the purposes of the FAA; rather, the court found the rule
functioned merely as "a refinement of the unconscionability analysis applicable to
contracts generally in California." 25
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and found the FAA preempts state
common law where such common law makes "preference for procedures that are
incompatible with arbitration and 'would wholly eviscerate arbitration agree-
ments."' 26 The Supreme Court also agreed with the Ninth Circuit that § 2 of the
FAA does not extend so far as to preserve state laws which would "stand as an
obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA's objectives."27 However, the Su-
preme Court found the Discover Bank rule did interfere with the objectives of the
FAA.28 Thus, the FAA preempted Discover Bank insofar as it permitted a party to
in Laster which, at the time of AT&T's motion to consolidate Concepcion, had been stayed pending a
decision by the Ninth Circuit on whether class waivers were unconscionable and therefore uncnforcca-
ble as held by the district court. On September 7, 2006, the district court granted AT&T's motion and
consolidated the Concepcion case into Laster. Despite the Ninth Circuit's eventual holding in Laster
that class waivers were unconscionable, AT&T moved to compel the Concepcions to arbitrate in 2008.
Brief for Appellec at 9-10, Concepcion v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (2009) (No. 08-56384),
2009 WL 2494187.
18. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744-45.
19. Id. at 1745.
20. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 76 (Cal. 2005).
21. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745. The district court relegated discussion of FAA preemption to a
footnote, briefly stating "the Court declines to conclude the FAA preempts any holding that ATTM's
arbitration provisions is unenforceable under Califormia law." Laster v. T-Mobilc USA, Inc., No.
05CVl 167, 2008 WL 5216255, at *14 n.l I (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008).
22. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745.
23. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2011).
24. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 857-58 (9th Cir. 2009).
25. Id. at 857.
26. Id. at 1748.
27. Id. The Supreme Court goes on to say "a federal statute's saving clause 'cannot in reason be
construed as allowing a common law right, the continued existence of which would be absolutely
inconsistent with the provisions of the act. In other words, the act cannot be held to destroy itself."'
Id (quoting Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 446 (1907)).
28. Id at 1750.
No. 1] 283
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demand class arbitration "ex post" in direct contradiction with the explicit terms
and expectations of the parties' agreement. 29 Because the Discover Bank rule was
preempted by the FAA, where it attempts to "manufacture" class arbitration rather
than allowing it to be consensual, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's
denial of AT&T's motion to compel bilateral arbitration and remanded the case
for further proceedings. 30
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Interplay Between the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925
and the US. Constitution
The United States Arbitration Act of 1925-commonly referred to as the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)3 '-was enacted by Congress to "make valid and
enforceable agreements for arbitration contained in contracts involving interstate
commerce or within the jurisdiction of admiralty, or which may be the subject of
litigation in the Federal courts." 32 By invoking the term of art "involving interstate
commerce," Congress made clear use of its Commerce Clause powers under the
U.S. Constitution when enacting the FAA. 3 The Commerce Clause, therefore,
necessarily limits the scope of the FAA, though its reach is still broadly defined.34
The U.S. Supreme Court has held the reach of the FAA, empowered by the full
authority of the Commerce Clause, extends to any such transactions which touch
upon "the flow of interstate commerce."3 5 The scope of the FAA, then, can be said
to reach any contract-alone not having a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce-that pertains to "general practices . . . [which] bear on interstate com-
merce in a substantial way."36
Enacted under the Commerce Clause, the FAA gains an important power: the
power of preemption. The preemption doctrine, derived from the Supremacy
Clause,37 requires valid federal law to supersede state law where such state law
stands incongruent to the objectives and purposes of the federal law.3 8 The doc-
29. Id
30. Id. at 1753.
31. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2011).
32. H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924) (emphasis added).
33. See Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56 (2003) ("We have interpreted the term
'involving commerce' in the FAA as the functional equivalent of the more familiar term 'affecting
commeree'-words of art that ordinarily signal the broadest permissible exercise of Congress' Com-
merce Clause Power"); see also U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
34. See Citizens Bank, 539 U.S. at 56.
35. Id. ("the [FAA] provides for the enforcement of arbitration agreement within the full reach of the
Commerce Clause . . . the FAA encompasses a wider range of transactions than those actually 'in
commerec'-that is, 'within the flow of interstate commerce"' (quoting Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273 (1995))).
36. Id. at 57.
37. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2.
38. Put another way, "[the Supremacy Clause] requires courts to ignore state law if (but only if) state
law contradicts a valid rule established by federal law, so that applying the state law would entail
disregarding the valid federal rule." Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REv. 225, 234 (2000).
284 [Vol. 2012
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trine can come in the form of either express or implied preemption. 39 When a
federal statute preempts state law through its structure or purpose, rather than
express language, such conflict is known as "implied conflict preemption.AO Un-
der the implied conflict preemption doctrine two preemption categories emerge:
either the state law stands as an obstacle inconsistent to the purposes and objec-
tives of federal law ("obstacle preemption")4 1 or state law makes it impossible for
a party to comply with both federal and state law simultaneously ("impossibility
preemption"). 42
B. The FAA and State Law Preemption: Southland Corp. v. Keating
It was not until 1984 that the U.S. Supreme Court first held the FAA to be en-
forceable in state court and preemptive of conflicting state law-this pivotal deci-
sion was expressed in Southland v. Keating.43 Southland Corporation, the owner
and franchisor of 7-Eleven convenience stores, was sued by approximately 800 of
its franchisees in a California state court under a class action spearheaded by
Richard Keating, arguing, amongst other claims, that Southland violated disclo-
sure requirements under the California Franchise Investment Law (FIL).44 In re-
sponse, Southland moved to compel arbitration under the terms of its standard
franchise agreements with franchisees. 45 Upon reaching the California Supreme
Court, FIL claims were held not to be a valid subject of arbitration because the
FIL required judicial consideration of any such claims brought under it.46 Addi-
tionally, the California Supreme Court noted the FIL did not contravene the FAA
39. See Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008) ("Congress may indicate pre-cmptive
intent through a statute's express language or through its structure and purpose").
40. Determining whether a federal statute preempts a state law falls largely on congressional intent.
See Retail Clerk Intern. Ass'n, Local 1625, AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1963)
("The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone. Congress under the Commerce Clause may
displace state power . .. or it may even by silence indicate a purpose to let state regulation be imposed
on the federal regime"). In attempting to interpret congressional intent, courts will use a categorial
approach. The first category is an express preemption, under which courts analyze the language of the
federal statute to determine if it expressly removes powers from the states. The second category is a
two-part implied preemption analysis, under which courts determine whether federal legislation occu-
pies a field so pervasively that it entirely precludes state laws which touch upon the same subject
("implied field preemption") or whether federal legislation directly conflicts with state law ("implied
conflict preemption"). See generally Karen A. Jordan, The Shifting Preemption Paradigm: Conceptual
and Interpretive Issues, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1149 (1998).
41. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); see also Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitra-
tion Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 397-98 (2004).
42. Id.
43. See generally Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. I (1984).
44. Id. at 4; see California Franchise Investment Law, CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 31000-31516 (West
1977).
45. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 1. The standard franchise agreement provided that "any controver-
sy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach thereof shall be settled by arbitra-
tion in accordance with the Rules of the American Arbitration Association ... and judgment upon any
award rendered by the arbitrator may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof." Id. South-
land's motion to compel arbitration under these terms was at first denied by the trial court. Id. On
appeal, the California Court of Appeals reversed, finding the arbitration clause, as wntten, compelled
the parties to arbitrate all claims arising under the agreement, including those under the FIL. In the
alternative, the court of appeals argued that, to the extent the FIL conflicts with the FAA, it is preempt-
ed by the FAA under the Supremacy Clause. Id. at 5.
46. Id.
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and therefore was not preempted by it, quelling an earlier concern first proposed
by the California Court of Appeals. 47
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed with the latter and reversed the California
Supreme Court's ruling, finding an anti-waiver provision of the FIL to be in direct
conflict with the FAA. 4 8 This anti-waiver provision provided that any term at-
tempting to bind persons acquiring a franchise to waive compliance to a provision
encompassed in the FIL is void.49
In analyzing whether the anti-waiver provision violated the provisions of the
FAA, the Supreme Court began by saying "in enacting § 2 of the [FAA],o Con-
gress declared a national policy favoring arbitration."s' The Court also stated the
enactment of the FAA under the Commerce Clause clearly implied the substantive
rules of the FAA were equally applicable to both state and federal courts.5 2 Con-
sequently, the Court found § 2-the substantive law of the FAA-to apply to state
proceedings.5 3 However, the Court prudently clarified neither § 3 nor § 4, which
purports to command use of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in proceedings
to compel arbitration, apply to state court proceedings.54 Because § 2 of the FAA
reached state-made law such as the FIL, the majority concluded the FIL substan-
tively violated the FAA where it attempted to undercut the enforceability of arbi-
tration agreements insofar as judicial consideration was required for any claims
brought under it.55 Accordingly, because an anti-waiver provision of the FIL in-
validated any attempt to circumvent mandatory judicial consideration of FL dis-
putes, the Court held the FIL stood in direct conflict with federal law and so was
preempted by the FAA as an exercise of the Supremacy Clause power. 56
47. Id.
48. Id. at 10.
49. The language of the statute reads: "[a]ny condition, stipulation or provision purporting to bind
any person acquiring any franchise to waive compliance with any provision of this law or rule or order
hereunder is void." CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512 (West 1977).
50. Section 2, the keystone of the FAA, states in pertinent part: "A written provision in ... a con-
tract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation ofany contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2011).
51. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 10. Recalling that Congress enacted the FAA under authority of
the Commerce Clause, the Court also noted the FAA was limited to only those contracts concerning
maritime or commerce concerns. Id
52. Id. at 12 ("the [FAA] was an exercise of the Commerce Clause power [which] clearly implied
that the substantive rules of the Act were to apply to state as well as federal courts.").
53. Id at 14-15 ("[w]e therefore view the 'involving commerce' requirement in § 2, not as an inex-
plicable limitation on the power of the federal courts, but as a necessary qualification on a statute
intended to apply in state and federal courts").
54. Id. at 16 n. 10.
55. Id. at 16.
56. Id. ("[i]n creating a substantive rule applicable to state as well as federal courts, Congress in-
tended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.
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C. Considering an Early Standard for Applying Preemption
Under the FAA: Perry v. Thomas
The Supreme Court took up the issue of FAA preemption again in Perry v.
Thomas, a case decided in 1987." In Perry, the Court again held that § 2 of the
FAA preempted a California state law, this time in the form California Labor
Code § 229.58 The majority of the case concerned whether a prior decision, Mer-
rill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, had already decided the issue of
preemption under § 229.59 Specifically, Ware held that § 229 was not preempted
by the Supremacy Clause and did not interfere with the federal regulatory
schemeP" The Court in Perry noted, however, that Ware was limited in scope and
resolved only the preemptive effect of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 on §
229-it did not consider whether § 229 was preempted by the FAA.6' Considering
whether the FAA preempted § 229, the majority found "clear federal policy places
§ 2 of the [FAA] in unmistakable conflict" with § 229 where it commands the use
of judicial forums for resolving wage disputes.62 Thus, the Court found, § 229 was
preempted by the FAA under the Supremacy Clause.63
An argument that the arbitration agreement in Perry constituted an uncon-
scionable and unenforceable contract of adhesion was relegated to a footnote and
summarily dismissed. 4 The Court commented, however, on the choice-of-law
issue arising from potential defenses asserting unconscionability as a valid justifi-
cation for voiding arbitration clauses by expressing its opinion that state law is
applicable only where such law arose to govern the enforceability of contracts
generally-in contrast to those state laws which derive meaning only from the fact
that arbitration is at issue. 6 Thus, the Court warned, any state attempts to capital-
ize on the uniqueness of arbitration agreements as a means of invalidating such
agreements as unconscionable would be met with disfavor.6 6
57. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
58. Id. at 483. The disputed state law held that actions for collection of wages may be maintained
"without regard to the existence of any private agreement to arbitrate." CAL. LAB. CODE § 229.
59. See Mcmil Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973).
60. Id. at 139-40.
61. See Perry, 482 U.S. at 491 ("[t]he oblique reference to the Federal Arbitration Act in footnote 15
of Ware cannot fairly be read as a definitive holding that [§ 229 is not in conflict with § 2 of the
FAA]").
62. Id.
63. Id at 491-92.
64. Id. at 492 n. 9.
65. Id. ("[an agreement to arbitrate is valid, irrevocable, and enforceable as a matter offederal law
. . . save upon such grounds as exists at law or equity for the revocation of any contract. Thus state
law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable if that law arose to govern issues concerning
the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally. A state-law principle that takes its
meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with this re-
quirement of § 2 [of the FAA]").
66. Id. ("a court [may not] rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-
law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would enable the court to effect what
we hold today the state legislature cannot").
No. 1] 287
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D. Tackling the Effect of Choice-of-Law Clauses on FAA Preemption:
Volt v. Board of Trustees
In 1989, the Supreme Court tackled the issue foreseen in Perry v. Thomas, the
effect choice-of-law clauses have on FAA preemption.6 7 In Volt Info Sciences,
Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., the parties entered into a con-
struction contract which contained both an agreement to arbitrate all disputes and
a choice-of-law clause requiring application of California law.6 8 The California
Arbitration Act (CAA)69 contained a provision, § 1281.2(c), providing state courts
the ability to stay an arbitration proceeding when a third party not bound to the
arbitration was involved in related litigation.70 Leland Stanford Junior University
sued Volt Information Sciences in California state court while simultaneously
seeking indemnity from two other companies involved in the construction contract
at issue, who were not a part of the arbitration agreement. ' Volt moved to compel
arbitration and Stanford, in turn, moved to stay arbitration pursuant to §
1281.2(c). 72 The trial court denied Volt's motion and stayed the arbitration pro-
ceeding until the conclusion of the indemnity claims against the two third-party
companies pursuant to § 1281.2(c), which the court of appeals affirmed.
Upon denial by the California Supreme Court to hear the case, the U.S. Su-
preme Court again took up the matter of interpreting the preemptive effect of the
FAA and turned first to § 4, which allows a party to an arbitration agreement to
petition a federal district court for an order directing arbitration in a manner con-
sistent with the terms of the agreement. 74 The Court found § 4 of the FAA "does
not confer a right to compel arbitration of any dispute at any time" and so found
no conflict between the FAA and § 1281.2(c) of the CAA, which does not prevent
arbitration but merely provides an ability to postpone it pursuant to the terms
agreed upon by the parties.75 The Supreme Court reasoned that, although the con-
tract in dispute falls squarely within the scope of the FAA, the FAA contains nei-
ther express language nor does it purport to occupy the entire field of arbitration
with which to preempt § 1281.2(c).
The Court relied heavily on its determination that the FAA "was motivated,
first and foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce agreements into which
67. See generally Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468 (1989).
68. Id. at 468. The choice-of law clause provided that "the Contract shall be governed by the law of
the place where the Project is located." The project, which involved installing a system of electrical
conduits, was to take place on the campus of Leland Stanford Junior University in California. Id at
470.
69. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1280-1284 (West 1982).
70. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc., 489 U.S. at 470; see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2(c) (West 1982).
71. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc., 489 U.S. at 470-71.
72. Id. at 471.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 474; see 9 U.S.C. §4 (2011).
75. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc, 489 U.S. at 474-75. Recall also that the Supreme Court had already
declared § 4 of the FAA does not apply to state court proceedings. See Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U.S. 1, 16 n.10 (1984).
76. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc., 489 U.S. at 476-77. The language used by the court also serves as a
good example of a court's use of the "categorical approach" to interpreting preemption effects under
the FAA. See Jordan, supra note 40, at 1150; see supra note 28.
288 [Vol. 2012
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parties had entered."77 Therefore, the majority concluded that arbitration under the
FAA was a matter of consent as opposed to coercion, promoting the notion that
parties are free to bargain for the terms incorporated into an arbitration agree-
ment.78 Here, the parties' consensual intent to abide by state rules of arbitration lie
congruent to the purposes of the FAA, even if arbitration is stayed under state law
where it would otherwise press on under the FAA."
E. Applying the Principles of Perry Footnote #9:
Doctor's Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto
In 1996, the Supreme Court circled back to its important footnote in Perry8 0
to mark a clear distinction between the differences of generally applicable contract
defenses and those defenses which "rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to
arbitrate" as a basis for holding arbitration clauses unenforceable.8 1 In Doctor's
Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, the Court wrestled with a Montana statute which de-
clared arbitration clauses found in franchise agreements unenforceable unless
proper notice of the requirement to arbitrate was provided to the franchisee. 82
Proper notice, in this case, required typing in underlined capital letters on the first
page of the contract a notification that the franchise agreement was subject to
arbitration.8 The Court was quick to point out the state statute's first-page notice
requirement did not govern over contracts generally but, instead, applied specifi-
cally to the enforceability of arbitration agreements. 84 Accordingly, the law was
preempted by § 2 of the FAA under the Supremacy Clause.8 5 In an oft-quoted
phrase, the Court summed up congressional intent in its enactment of the FAA by
saying "Congress precluded States from singling out arbitration provisions for
suspect status, requiring instead that such provisions be placed 'upon the same
footing as other contracts."' 86
77. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc., 489 U.S. at 478.
78. Id. at 479.
79. Id. ("arbitration under the [FAA] in [sic] a matter of consent, not coercion, and the parties are
generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit . . . where, as here, the parties
agreed to abide by state arbitration rules, enforcing those rules according to the terms of the agreement
is fully consistent with the goals of the FAA, even if the result is that arbitration is stayed when the
[FAA] would otherwise permit it to go forward").
80. Recall the Supreme Court distinguished state laws applying to contracts generally from state
laws which derive meaning solely from the fact arbitration is at issue. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483,
492 n.9 (1987) ("state law, whether of legislative or judicial ongin, is applicable if that law arose to
govem issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally. A state-
law principles that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does
not comport with this requirement of § 2.").
81. See Doctor's Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996); see also Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9.
82. Doctor's Assoc., Inc, 517 U.S. at 683; see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1997).
83. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1997).
84. Doctor's Assoc, Inc., 517 U.S. at 687.
85. Id.
86. Id at 687.
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F. The Early Stages of Class Arbitration & Preemption Under the FAA
In 2003, the Supreme Court faced yet another attack on the scope of the
preemption powers under the FAA-whether a state court, pursuant to state law,
could order class-wide arbitration where the arbitration agreement had been silent
on the issue.8 7 In Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, Lynn and Burt Bazzle
obtained a loan from Green Tree which contained an agreement requiring arbitra-
tion of all disputes, claims, or controversies arising out of the agreement.8 8 The
Bazzles sought class certification against Green Tree in a South Carolina state
court, alleging Green Tree violated § 37-10-102 of the South Carolina Code 89
providing debtors a right to name their own lawyers and insurance agents.90 Upon
reaching the South Carolina Supreme Court, the Bazzles' class arbitration claim
was authorized pursuant to a state court order under state common law since the
arbitration agreement appeared silent concerning class arbitration.91 The U.S.
Supreme Court agreed the arbitration clause was vague on the permissibility of
class arbitration under the terms of the contract. 92 However, the Court found the
vagueness of the arbitration clause did not permit automatic application of state
common law.93 Instead, under the terms of the arbitration clause, the Court found
"the parties seem to have agreed that an arbitrator, not a judge, would answer the
relevant question" of whether to permit class-wide arbitration.94 Avoiding a
87. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 447 (2003).
88. The arbitration clause reads in full:
ARBITRATION-All disputes, claims, or controversies arising from or relating to this contract or
the relationships which result from this contract . . . shall be resolved by binding arbitration by
one arbitrator selected by us with consent of you. This arbitration contract is made pursuant to a
transaction in interstate commerce, and shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act at 9
U.S.C. § I ... THE PARTIES VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY WAIVE ANY RIGHT
THEY HAVE TO A JURY TRIAL, EITHER PURSUANT TO ARBITRATION UNDER THIS
CLAUSE OR PURSUANT TO A COURT ACTION BY U.S. (AS PROVIDED HEREIN) ...
The parties agree and understand that the arbitrator shall have all powers provided by the law and
the contract. These powers shall include all legal and equitable remedies, including, but not lim-
ited to, money damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief.
Id. at 447-48 (capitalization in original).
89. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-10-102 (2002).
90. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 539 U.S. at 448-49.
91. Id. at 450; see also Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349, 360 (S.C. 2002) ("No case
law or statute in South Carolina prohibits class-wide arbitration. To the contrary, this Court strongly
favors arbitration and has held that a state court may order consolidation of claims subject to mandato-
ry arbitration without any contractual or statutory directive to do so." (citing Episcopal Hous. Corp. v.
Fed. Ins. Co., 255 S.E.2d 451 (S.C. 1979))).
92. Green Tree Fin Corp., 539 U.S. at 451.
93. Id.
94. Id. The Supreme Court looked to the construction of the arbitration clause itself for guidance,
which stated an arbitrator was to decide "all disputes, claims, or controversies arising from or relating
to this contract or the relationships which result from this contract." Thus, the Court opined the parties
had agreed an arbitrator was to decide the dispute whether class-wide arbitration was permissible under
the terms of the contract. This finding harkens back, in spirit at least, to the choice-of-law principles
under Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., such that the dispute
between parties was more appropriately resolved by a thorough consideration of the contractual terms
agreed upon by the parties rather than create a superfluous conflict of federal and state law under the
preemption doctrine typically applied. This methodology holds true to the general principle that "arbi-
290 [Vol. 2012
10
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2012, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2012/iss1/12
Concerning Preemption
preemption analysis altogether, the plurality remanded the case so that the arbitra-
tor could interpret the vague elements found in the contract consistent with the
express terms of the parties' arbitration agreement, whereby the parties' agreed an
arbitrator would manage any disputes, claims or controversies arising out of such
agreement.95
The Supreme Court was forced to clarify its decision in Bazzle seven years
later, when once again an arbitration clause fell silent on the permissibility of class
arbitration.96 In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int Corp., AnimalFeeds
sought class arbitration under its charter party with Stolt-Nielsen based upon alle-
gations that Stolt-Nielsen was engaged in illegal price fixing.97 The parties entered
into a subsequent agreement under which the question of class arbitrability was to
be submitted to a panel of arbitrators for decision-stipulating that the arbitration
clause was "silent" on such issue.98 The panel, influenced by several arbitral rul-
ings after Bazzle which allowed "a wide variety of clauses in a wide variety of
settings" to permit class arbitration, concluded class arbitration was permitted
under the charter party's terms.99
Upon reaching the Supreme Court, the Court found the panel had overstepped
its contractually granted authority when it failed to consider whether a default rule
existed under the FAA, federal maritime law, or state law which permits class
arbitration "in the absence of express consent."'" The Court clarified that Bazzle
was not to be viewed as the general rule of deciding whether class arbitration is
permissible under the terms of an agreement, so far as it suggests an arbitrator is
to make the final decision in every instance of vagueness or silence.'o' The Court
tration is a matter of contract" first and foremost. See generally First Options of Chicago, Inc. v.
Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
95. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 539 U.S. at 454. Chief Justice Rehnquist, of whom Justice O'Connor
and Justice Kennedy joined, wrote in a dissent that the South Carolina court had not enforced the
partics' arbitration agreement according to its terms and so the court's decision was thereby preempted
by the FAA. The Chief Justice believed the arbitration clause gave Green Tree "the contractual right
to choose an arbitrator for each dispute [it had] with the other 3,734 individual class members, and this
right was denied when the same arbitrator was foisted upon [Green Tree] to resolve those claims as
well." Thus, because class arbitration necessarily extinguished Green Tree's rights under contract, the
state court's decision to authorize class arbitration was in conflict with the arbitration agreement and
therefore preempted by the FAA. Id. at 455-60.
96. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1764 (2010).
97. The charter party contained the following arbitration clause:
Arbitration. Any dispute arising from the making, performance or termination of this Charter
Party shall be settled in New York, Owner and Charterer each appointing an arbitrator, who shall
be a merchant, broker or individual experienced in the shipping business; the two thus chosen, if
they cannot agree, shall nominate a third arbitrator who shall be an Admiralty lawyer. Such arbi-
tration shall be conducted in conformity with the provisions and procedure of the United States
Arbitration Act [i.e., the FAA], and a judgment of the Court shall be entered upon any award
made by said arbitrator.
Id. at 1765.
98. Id. at 1765-66.
99. Id.
100. Id. atl 769. The Supreme Court, instead, relegated the panel's approach to nothing more than an
attempt to act as if it had common-law authority to "develop what it viewed as the best rule to be
applied in such a situation"-something the charter party had not granted the panel authority to do. Id.
at 1768-69.
101. The Supreme Court informatively stated:
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went on to say that the parties are generally free to devise an arbitration agreement
as they see fit, limiting the issues to be arbitrated, agreeing on the rules arbitration
will abide by, and designating who will handle specific disputes. 02 Taken togeth-
er, the majority concluded the parties could not be compelled under the FAA to
submit to class arbitration where no contractual basis exists for inferring the par-
ties had consented to do so. 0 3 Because the arbitration panel attempted to assert
authority on an issue which the parties stipulated they had not agreed upon, the
Court found the arbitration panel ventured beyond its contractually granted au-
thority when it ordered class arbitration.'1 In sum, the majority eloquently stated
"we see the question as being whether the parties agreed to authorize class arbi-
tration."' 0 5
G. The Immediate History Leading Up to
AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion
Unlike either Bazzle or Stolt-Nielsen, the California decision at issue in Con-
cepcion-Discover Bank v. Superior Court-dealt with an arbitration clause ex-
pressly forbidding class arbitration.106 In Discover Bank, Christopher Boehr sued
Discover Bank for deceptive practices after it levied late charges on Boehr's credit
account despite prior representations by Discover Bank that no such charges
would be assessed if payment was received by a certain date. o0 Against the ex-
press terms of their agreement, 08 Boehr sought class arbitration in pursuing his
Unfortunately . . . both parties and the arbitration panel seem to have misunderstood Bazzlc ...
[in believing] that it established the standard to be applied by a decision maker in determining
whether a contract may permissibly be interpreted to allow class arbitration . . . Bazzle did not
establish the rule to be applied in deciding whether class arbitration is permitted.
Id at 1772.
102. Id. at 1774.
103. Id at 1775.
104. Id. This decision is reconcilable with Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle in that the arbitrator in
Bazzle was tasked with interpreting a vague arbitration clause which neither confirmed nor denied the
permissibility of class arbitration. In contrast, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int 7 Corp. dealt with
an arbitration clause whereby the parties had expressly stipulated no agreement on class arbitration was
reached. Ergo, consent was the question at issue in the former, permitting the arbitrator an ability to
make a determination on class arbitrability. Consent was wholly missing in the latter and so precluded
the arbitrators from making a decision on class arbitrability.
105. Id. at 1776 (emphasis in original). Once again, the Supreme Court reminds us arbitration is a
matter of contract and thus, ultimately, "a matter of consent, not coercion." Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v.
Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989).
106. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 76, 79 (Cal. 2005).
107. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged in his petition that Discover Bank represented to its credit
cardholders that late fees would be charged against their accounts only if payment had not been re-
ceived by a certain date. In actuality, however, Discover Bank would charge late fees against cardhold-
crs' accounts if payment was not received by at least 1PM on such date. Id. at 78.
108. The agreement provided: "In the event you or [Discover Bank] elect to resolve any claims or
disputes between us by arbitration, neither you nor we shall have the right to litigate that claim in court
or to have a jury trial on that claim . . . [n]cither you nor [Discover Bank] shall be entitled to join or
consolidate claims in arbitration by or against other cardmembers with respect to other accounts, or
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claim against Discovery Bank, arguing California law made class arbitration
waivers unconscionable.'
09
Upon reaching the California Supreme Court, class arbitration was upheld
and the class-action waiver was severed from the agreement as unconscionable,
despite a prior finding by the court of appeals that state law is preempted by the
FAA where such law attempts to invalidate class arbitration waivers as uncon-
scionable."o The California Supreme Court found the court of appeal's conclusion
"puzzling" because it seemingly ignored the distinction made in Perry-in con-
sidering the language of § 2 of the FAA-between state laws which apply to con-
tracts generally and those which derive meaning solely from the fact that arbitra-
tion is at issue."' Thus, the California Supreme Court held that "when [a class-
arbitration] waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion," it shall be
deemed unconscionable if disputes would foreseeably involve small amounts of
damages and the party with superior bargaining power is alleged to have carried
out a scheme to deliberately cheat the consumer. 112 Believing such a ruling to be
applicable to contracts generally, and therefore satisfying the requirements of § 2
of the FAA, the court found the class arbitration waiver in the agreement between
Boehr and Discover Bank to be both unconscionable and unenforceable." 3
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the U.S. Supreme Court again consid-
ered the effect California state law had on the FAA, where such law attempted to
wholly proscribe the use of class arbitration waivers seeking to prevent the use of
class arbitration in commercial service agreements.114 Justice Scalia delivered the
plurality opinion, with whom Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy, Justice Alito, and
Justice Thomas joined. Justice Thomas wrote a separate concurring opinion. Jus-
tice Breyer, with whom Justice Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan
joined, wrote the dissenting opinion.
A. Plurality Opinion
The plurality disagreed with the Concepcions' contention that the Discover
Bank rule-holding unconscionable all class arbitration waivers which are part of
a contract of adhesion-is a ground that "exist[s] at law or in equity for the revo-
cation of any contract" pursuant to § 2 of the FAA."' The Court considered two
primary objectives of the FAA which are incongruent with the Discover Bank
rule: enforcement of private agreements according to their terms and encourage-
109. Id at 80.
110. Id. at 81.
111. The California Supreme Court believed its holding in Discover Bank did not just apply to class-
action waiver in arbitration agreements, but to any contract. In essence, the court believed it was mere-
ly refining the definition of unconscionability to be applied to all contracts generally. Id. at 89.
112. Id at 87.
113. Id.
114. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
115. Id. at 1746.
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ment of efficient and speedy dispute resolution." 6 Thus, the Court reiterated, as it
had in numerous decisions before Concepcion, that "the overarching purpose of
the FAA ... is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to
their terms."" 7 Concordantly, the Court stated, as it had in Stolt-Nielsen, that are
free to devise an arbitration agreement as they see fit, limiting the issues to be
arbitrated, agreeing on the rules arbitration will abide by, and restricting the par-
ties for whom arbitration will occur."' Thus, the Court found that, so far as the
Discover Bank rule can be held to require the availability of class arbitration-
even if it does not expressly require class arbitration itself-it runs afoul of the
protections afforded under the FAA in the event that it might vary the terms
agreed upon by the parties "ex post."" 9
The Court also found the Discovery Bank rule interfered with the goal of en-
couraging efficient and speedy dispute resolution for three reasons. 120 First,
switching from bilateral to class arbitration sacrifices informality for a slower,
more costly process which is more likely to promote convoluted uncertainty than
expedited finality.121 Second, class arbitration requires procedural formality be-
cause informal procedures would cause the class representative to inadequately
represent the interests of absent class members, resulting in those members being
unbound by the determinations of the arbitration process.122 Third, class arbitra-
tion increases the risk to defendants-who might ordinarily accept minor errors in
informal bilateral arbitration as a worthwhile tradeoff-where the aggregation of
every possible claim, to be decided all at once, makes such complete and uncor-
rectable finality insufferable in the eyes of defendants.123 For these reasons, the
Court found "arbitration [to be] poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litiga-
tion." 24
In sum, the plurality found the Discover Bank rule, rather than applying to
contracts generally, created a unique burden particularly discriminatory to arbitra-
tion agreements.125 Thus, Discover Bank was preempted by the FAA because it
"stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress." 26 Additionally, the plurality was unimpressed by
the self-imposed limitations of the Discover Bank rule, which purportedly applied
116. Id. at 1749.
117. Id. at 1748 (emphasis added).
118. Id. at 1748-49 ("parties may agree to limit the issues subject to arbitration, to arbitrate according
to specific riles, and to limit with whom a party will arbitrate its dispute" (quoting Stott-Nielsen S.A.,
130 S. Ct. at 1763)).
119. The Supreme Court rationalized that the Discover Bank rule ultimately manufactured class
arbitration rather than allowing it to be consensually agreed upon by the parties and was thus incon-
sistent with the principles of the FAA. Id. at 1748, 1750-51.
120. Id at 1749-50.
121. Id. at 1751 ("the principal advantage of arbitration-its informality-[is sacrificed] and makes
the process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment").
122. Id. ("[i]f procedures are too informal, absent class members would not be bound by the arbitra-
tion. For a class-action money judgment to bind absentees in litigation, class representatives must at all
times adequately represent class members, and absent members must be afforded notice, an opportuni-
ty to be heard, and a right to opt out of the class" (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797
(1985))).
123. Id. at 1752.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1750-53.
126. Id. at 1753.
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only to arbitration agreements found in contracts of adhesion, finding such re-
quirements to be "toothless and malleable ... [and of] no limiting effect."127
B. Justice Thomas' Concurring Opinion
While agreeing with the plurality's outcome, Justice Thomas' rationale for his
concurrence differed slightly. Justice Thomas reasoned that § 2 and § 4 of the
FAA, when read together, demand something more than a mere requirement that
"a defense [must] apply to 'any contract"" 28 when attempting to invalidate an
arbitration provision;129 instead, "there must be some additional limit on the con-
tract defenses permitted by § 2."l30 Justice Thomas believed a combined reading
of § 2 and § 4 permitted exceptions to the enforceability of arbitration agreements
only on those contractual grounds "related to the making of the agreement ...
such as fraud, duress, or mutual mistake."' 3' Because the Discover Bank rule does
not touch upon the making of an agreement-such that it cannot be irrefutably
established that a person would sign an unconscionable agreement only when
under the influence of fraud, duress, or delusion-Justice Thomas concluded it
was preempted by the FAA.132
C. Dissenting Opinion
The dissent found the Discover Bank rule could not be appropriately catego-
rized as one which stood as an obstacle to the purposes and objectives of the FAA.
133 It believed the Discover Bank rule applied to contracts generally, without im-
posing undue restraint upon arbitration agreements specifically.' 34 In other words,
the Discover Bank rule was consistent with the FAA because it refused to enforce
arbitration "on grounds that exist for the revocation of any contract" per the lan-
guage of § 2 of the FAA.135 The dissent also attacked the plurality's postulation
that bilateral arbitration is a fundamental attribute of arbitration, finding no mean-
ingful precedent which demonstrates a preference for bilateral arbitration over
127. Id. at 1750. The Discover Bank rule has three specific requirements: (1) the arbitration clause
must be found in a contract of adhesion; (2) damages under the contract must be predictably small; and
(3) the consumer must allege a scheme under the contract to cheat consumers. Id
128. Id. at 1753 (Thomas, J., concurring). Recall that § 2 of the FAA requires that an arbitration
provisions "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such ground as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
129. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct.. at 1753.
130. Id. Justice Thomas looks to the language of § 4 to clarify the scope of § 2, whereby a federal
court must first be "satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply
therewith is not in issue" before ordering arbitration "in accordance with the terms of the agreement."
Id. at 1754.
131. Id. at 1754-55.
132. Id. at 1755-56.
133. Id.
134. Id at 1757 ("the Discover Bank rule is consistent with the [FAA]'s language. It 'applies equally
to class action litigation waivers in contracts without arbitration agreement as it does to class arbitra-
tion waivers in contracts with such agreements"' (quoting Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 76, 88-89 (Cal. 2005))).
135. Id.; see also 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) ("an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and en-
forceable, save upon such grounds as exists at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract").
15
Blank: Blank: Concerning Preemption
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
class arbitration.' 36 Finally, the dissent claimed the availability of class arbitration
under the Discovery Bank rule was necessary to protect the integrity of small-
value claims.13 7 The plurality, however, responded to this particular concern by
stating that states cannot require the availability of procedures such as class arbi-
tration when such procedure stands inconsistent with the FAA and against the
consensual agreement of the parties, even if doing so would produce desirable
results. 38
V. COMMENT
One might consider Concepcion to be nothing more than an age-old affirma-
tion of the FAA's principle purpose: holding private arbitration agreements to the
terms agreed upon by the parties. In fact, Concepcion serves as but one part of a
triad of modem cases by the U.S. Supreme Court signifying a broad intent to hold
parties to the terms bargained for in arbitration agreements. In the first, Green
Tree Financial v. Bazzle held that vagueness on the issue of class arbitration is to
be interpreted by the dispute-resolving entity agreed upon by the parties, whether
in the form of state law under a choice-of-law provision or a specified arbitrator
tasked with resolving disputes.'3 9 In the second, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal
Feeds Int'l Corp. held class arbitration to be impermissible where the parties had
not affirmatively agreed to it-silence being insufficient to enforce class arbitra-
tion.14 0 In the third, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion found class arbitration to be
precluded where it was specifically waived by the parties in their agreement.141
Thus, the focus of the Supreme Court lies firmly upon the element of consent:
where parties have been silent, no consent can be found; where parties have been
vague, contractual interpretation is necessary to unearth the parties' intent; where
parties have explicitly incorporated a term into their agreement, consent or lack
thereof has been elucidated and must therefore be followed according to such
term. Considering the precedent set forth by Bazzle and Stolt-Nielsen, it is difficult
to be surprised by the Supreme Court's direction in Concepcion.
It is undisputed that Concepcion's reach was not limited to California's Dis-
cover Bank rule, and it has since been used to strike down many different state
laws which attempt to incorporate similar provisions to Discover Bank.142 Howev-
136. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1759, 1762.
137. The dissent points out that AT&T could avoid the $7,500 payout under its agreement with the
Concepcions-"the payout that supposedly makes the Concepcions' arbitration worthwhile"-by
instead paying the face value of the Concepcions' claim, in this case $30.22. Low-value amounts such
as these would, in the dissent's opinion, all but nullify any realistic attempt to sue and would therefore
foreclose potential claimants' ability to collect on their claims. The dissent then imagines situations in
which claiming the $30.22 would require "filling out many forms that require technical legal
knowledge or waiting a great length while a call is placed on hold"-situations the Discover Bank rule
was designed to inhibit. Id. at 1760-61.
138. Id. at 1753 ("States cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is
desirable for unrelated reasons").
139. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S 444, 454 (2003).
140. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1762 (2010).
141. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751, 1753.
142. See Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205, 1215 (11th Cir. 2011) (striking down Flori-
da state law); Litman v. Cellco Partnership, No. 08-4103, 2011 WL 3689015, at *5 (3d Cir. Aug. 24,
2011) (striking down New Jersey state law).
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er, a few brave courts have ventured into unknown territory, attempting to temper
the broad implications of Concepcion. A California case following the Concep-
cion decision, Kanbar v. O'Melveny & Myers, emphasized that the Supreme Court
left open the capacity of state legislatures to create laws attempting to address the
concerns attending class arbitration waivers in contracts of adhesion, even though
not being able to outright proscribe them.143 For example, the Supreme Court
itself suggested the use of state law to require that class waivers be highlighted to
notify customers engaging in commercial contracts.'" The Kanbar court conclud-
ed this language implied not all state laws concerning unconscionable arbitration
agreements in contracts of adhesion are preempted by the FAA.14 5 The Kanbar
court then took a clever turn away from the influences of Concepcion when it
found two terms in an arbitration agreement concerning notice and confidentiality
to be unconscionable and thereby unenforceable.14 6 The court held the non-
enforcement of these problematic terms did not warrant preemption under the
FAA because non-enforcement did not constitute an "anti-arbitration" action
which would interfere with the fundamental purposes of arbitration-namely in-
formality, expeditiousness, and inexpensiveness.14 7
A Colorado case, Daugherty v. Encana Oil & Gas, Inc., bypassed the influ-
ences of Concepcion in much the same way.148 Here, the court found two arbitra-
tion provisions concerning attorney's fees and the requirement of using the Com-
mercial Rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) to be unconsciona-
ble, unenforceable, and therefore severable from the arbitration agreement as a
whole.149 Having brought a claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the
plaintiff argued generally that the terms of the arbitration agreement undermined
the policy objectives of the FLSA by denying access "to a judicial forum without
fear of unbearable costs." 50 The court agreed, striking down first the arbitration
provision requiring the use of the Commercial Rules of the AAA.' 5 1 The court
found such a provision would require plaintiff to pay one-half of the total costs of
arbitration-estimated between $15,000 and $76,000-per the Commercial Rules
and thus struck it down as unenforceable since it had the effect of precluding the
143. See Kanbar v. O'Melveny & Myers, No. C- 1-0892, 2011 WL 2940690, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jul.
21,2011).
144. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750 n.6 ("States remain free to take steps addressing the concerns
that attend contracts of adhesion-for example, requiring class-action-waivers provisions in adhesive
arbitration agreements to be highlighted.").
145. See Kanbar, 2011 WL 2940690 at *6.
146. Id. at *1-2. The notice provision required an employee to make known his claim against his
employer within one year, effectively acting as a one-year statute of limitation. The confidentiality
provision barred employees from speaking to anyone not directly involved in the arbitration process
about what took place during arbitration, effectively preventing employees involved in arbitration from
consulting with other employees to build a case against the employer. Id.
147. The Court held non-enforcement would not have an "anti-arbitration" effect because the non-
enforcement of the notice and confidentiality provisions would only amount to: "(1) a rule requiring
the same . . . statute of limitations as provided by applicable law; (2) a rule barring overly broad confi-
dentiality provisions that would stifle an employee's ability to investigate and gather evidence." Id. at
*9.
148. See Daugherty v. Encana Oil & Gas, Inc., No. 10-cv-02272-WJM-KLM, 2011 WL 2791338 (D.
Colo. Jul. 15, 2011).
149. Id at * 10- 13.
150. Id. at*10.
151. Id. at *ll.
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plaintiff from pursuing his claim.' 52Equally, the court struck down a provision
awarding attorney's fees to the "prevailing party" as opposed to the "prevailing
plaintiff," finding such opportunistic contract construction to substantially frus-
trate the statutory schemes of the FLSA.'53 The court then looked to the severabil-
ity laws of Colorado and concluded both opportunistic terms should be severed
from the arbitration agreement as a whole.154
Considering the implications of both Kanbar and Daugherty, it is clear courts
intend to limit the potential effect of Concepcion, and rightly so. Though some
legal commentators have decried its perceived ramifications-arguing the Su-
preme Court's holding offers little more than a boon to big business who can now
utilize class waivers in adhesion contracts to disclose the future possibility of class
action' 55-the intent of Concepcion was not to hold parties hostage to contracts of
adhesion no matter how manifestly unfair the terms or procedures; this is evident
by footnote 6 of the plurality's opinion.'56 It is equally evident by the Supreme
Court's past recognition that federal statutory claims are fully arbitrable under the
terms of an agreement only so far as arbitration preserves the ability for a party to
fully vindicate its statutory rights.157 Instead, Concepcion seeks only to enforce the
fundamental expectations of arbitration where it is consensual. As Kanbar and
Daugherty point out, this leaves open the possibility of severing unfair and unex-
pected terms from arbitration agreements where they attempt to pervert the basic
consensual expectations of arbitration itself, especially where such terms prevent
vindication of one's rights. This outcome makes sense when considering the na-
ture of consent, where it would be difficult, if not impossible, to substantiate its
existence when a contractual term delivers either unexpected results or complete
impairment of one's statutorily protected rights. Equally, as Justice Thomas point-
ed out in his concurring opinion of Concepcion, arbitration agreements should be
wholly invalidated where the formation of such agreements were made under
fraud or duress-attacking the assumption that consent ever existed to begin
with. 15
152. This result was distinguishable from AT&T Mobility, which did not prevent the Concepcions
from pursuing a claim against AT&T by use of a grossly unfair technicality. The service agreement
between AT&T and the Concepcions did not levy an exorbitant cost upon the Concepcions for at-
tempting to pursue a claim against AT&T. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at * 12. The court took note the contract between employee and employer contained a savings
clause and so, under Colorado law, the "agreement should not be completely obliterated because some
provisions are beyond the legal limits ... unless such illegal provisions permeate the complete contract
to such an extent as to affect its enforceability entirely" which was not the case here. Id. (quoting
N.L.R.B. v. Tulsa Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 367 F.2d 55, 60 (10th Cir. 1966)).
155. See, e.g, Scott L. Nelson, For Consumers, a Raw Deal, EXECUTIVE COUNSEL, Oct. 2011, at 42.
156. Concepczon, 131 S. Ct. at 1750 n.6. Qualifying its statement that "the times in which consumer
contracts [are] anything other than adhesive are long past," the Supreme Court states in full: "Of
course States remain free to take steps addressing the concerns that attend contracts of adhesion-for
example, requiring class-action-waiver provisions in adhesive arbitration agreements to be highlighted.
Such steps cannot, however, conflict with the FAA or frustrate its purpose to ensure that private arbi-
tration agreements are enforce according to their terms." Id.
157. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985).
158. Justice Thomas writes: "As I would read it, the FAA requires that an agreement to arbitrate be
enforced unless a party successfully challenges the formation of the arbitration agreement, such as by
providing fraud or duress." Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Concerning Preemption
Alongside the element of consent, it is also important to recall the literal lan-
guage of the FAA's savings clause codified in § 2, whereby all arbitration agree-
ments are "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, safe upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 5 9 By its very nature, the Dis-
cover Bank rule does not apply to any contract; it applies instead to a particular
breed of contract: those "consumer contract[s] of adhesion" which contain a class-
arbitration waiver provision." Thus, the Discover Bank rule effectuates a non-
rebuttable finding of both procedural and substantive unconscionability on quick-
look, pliable criteria, rather than permitting a fact-driven inquiry normally at-
tributable to unconscionability analysis.' 61 This sort of strict liability finding of
unconscionability disproportionately affects arbitration agreements found in con-
sumer contracts in violation of the FAA's requirement that such agreements stand
equivalent to contracts generally.162
Justice Breyer argues in his dissent that, linguistically speaking, the Discover
Bank rule was valid under the FAA because it equally applied to contracts both
with and without arbitration clauses.' 63 However, while the general principles of
unconscionability as a defense against contract enforcement may apply to all con-
tracts in California, the near automatic finding of unconscionability under Discov-
er Bank cannot be said to stand on grounds which applies to any contract. A sim-
ple illustration demonstrates this point: had the Concepcions sought to invalidate
as unconscionable a class-action waiver found in a user agreement issued by Pan-
dora Media, Inc. as part of its free-to-play internet music radio service-which
arguably cannot constitute a "consumer contract" by definition under the third
requirement of Discover Bank'"-the lax standards of Discover Bank in finding
159. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (cmphasis added).
160. Discover Bank v. Supenor Court, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 76, 87 (Cal. 2005).
161. Recall that Discover Bank requires only that a consumer contract of adhesion contain "small
amounts of damages" and "[allegations] that the party with the superior bargaining power ha carried
out a scheme to deliberately cheat a large number of consumers." Discover Bank, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d at
87. Neither of these elements promote the same level of scrutiny normally applicable to an uncon-
scionability analysis-whereby courts are often hesitate to displace the agreed-upon terms of the
parties. See generally 8 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 18:10 (4th cd. 1989).
162. Compare Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensley, Volunteering to Arbitrate Through Predis-
pute Arbitration Clauses, 2004 Law & Contemp. Probs. 55 (2004) (finding arbitration clauses ap-
peared in 35% of consumer contracts), with Elizabeth Rolph, Erik Moller, & John E. Rolph, Arbitra-
tion Agreements in Health Care: Myths and Reality, 60 Law & Contemp. Probs. 153 (1997) (finding
only 9% of physicians and hospitals use arbitration agreements), and Florencia Marotta-Wurgler,
"Unfair" Dispute Resolution Clauses- Much Ado About Nothing?, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION
OF MARKET CONTRACTS 45, 47-48 (Omri Ben-Shahar ed., 2007) (finding arbitration clauses in only
6% of 597 online end-user licenses).
163. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1757.
164. In defining the scope of the Discover Bank Rule, the California Supreme Court requires an
allegation be made that "the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat
large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money." Thus, one can infer that "con-
sumer contracts" under Discover Bank mean contracts between merchants and consumers involving
monetary transactions. Accordingly, with free-to-play services like Pandora Radio, it would be impos-
sible for the consumer to satisfy this third requirement of Discover Bank: that an allegation be made
that the superior power cheated the consumer out of small amounts of money. By its terms, Discover
Bank is thereby limited to contracts involving monetary transactions and would not cover user agree-
ments for free-to-play services. Discover Bank, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 87.
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unconscionability would be inapplicable.' 65 Therefore, Discover Bank is available
in some instances involving contractual relations between individuals and compa-
nies and not available in others.
What requires proper framing, then, is the consistency of Discover Bank's
applicability over the broad spectrum of contractual relationships. While Discover
Bank appropriately regulates both contracts with arbitration agreements and those
without, showing no particular discrimination against arbitration agreements as
Justice Breyer's suggested, it inappropriately serves to alienate consumer con-
tracts-which tend to utilize arbitration agreements more frequently-from the
larger majority of contracts in general.' 6 6 Given the precise language of § 2 of the
FAA, it would appear the Discover Bank rule, as a refinement to the general prin-
ciples of the unconscionability doctrine, is applicable to some types of contracts
but is not applicable to any contract as required-being limited by its very lan-
guage to a particular flavor of contractual agreement. Thus, the fact that Discover
Bank both results in a nearly ineluctable finding of unconscionability and is appli-
cable only to a narrow category of contractual agreements, as opposed to all con-
tractual agreements, makes it a clear violation of § 2 of the FAA when applied
against agreements to arbitrate.
In sum, Concepcion should not be hastily viewed as a disfavorable bane
against consumers; its principle purpose is not to champion big business seeking
to profit from the misfortunes of the proverbial "little guy." Rather, upon scrupu-
lous inspection, Concepcion stands as little more than a reaffirmation of an age-
old belief by the U.S. Supreme Court, in upholding congressional intent, that
agreements to arbitrate are to stand on the same footing as any other contract.
To such effect, state common law which disfavors arbitration as applied, or which
seeks to rob the element of consent from the basic equation of contractual agree-
ment, will undoubtedly meet judicial hostility from a Supreme Court which has
stood resolute in its general position that one's consent shall rule the day.
165. This hypothetical is inspired by a case entitled Deacon v. Pandora Media Inc., in which the
plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit against Pandora alleging, amongst other things, a violation of
privacy. No. 11-4674 (N.D. Cal. filed Sept. 20, 2011). At the time of writing this casenote, the case
remains in its infancy and a brief reading of Pandora's "Terms of Use" does not indicate whether
arbitration will come into play so as to incite the use of the FAA or Concepcion. Pandora Terms of
Use, http://www.pandora.com/legal/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2011).
166. See supra note 162.
167. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct.. at 1745 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)).
168. Consent being something congruent to the basic expectations of the parties, whereby unfairness
is only relevant when it attempts to distort or otherwise corrupt such expectations. The Concepcions
had free choice whether or not to purchase a phone from AT&T and abide by its terms of agreement;
other mobile phone carriers provided varying terms. By purchasing said phone, the Concepcions made
a conscious decision to agree to the terms encompassed in AT&T's service agreement as against all
other competitors. These terms, specifically the class arbitration waiver, did not serve to pervert the
basic notion of arbitration-informality, expeditiousness, and inexpensiveness-and in fact promoted
the opposite effect. It is difficult to find that, had the Concepcions read the agreement, they would be
surprised with the manner in which arbitration was to be carried out under AT&T's service agreement.
Thus, the dispute between the panics was properly categonzed as one party's attempt to circumvent
the bargained-for terms of the other party on a legal technicality, attacking the basic protections of
consensual agreement. The district court noted the agreement was not unduly burdensome against the
Concepcions, in fact it provided several consumer-friendly effects to arbitration. Thus, the class arbi-
tration waiver clause could not be said to rob the Concepcions of a meaningful way in which to settle a
dispute-upholding the arbitration clause did not necessarily demand injustice or attack the basic
sensibilities of contract law. Such a clause was nothing more than a bargained-for exchange between
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Concepcion reaffirms a principle purpose of the FAA's enactment in 1925: to
hold agreements to arbitrate on equal footing alongside other contractual agree-
ments. It aggregates a series of cases into a general, but long-held, position by the
U.S. Supreme Court to enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms.
Consent, then, becomes the paramount consideration and must serve as the start-
ing point for any analysis determining whether state law encroaches on the protec-
tions afforded by the FAA. To say, however, that consent overwhelms any con-
sideration of unfairness when scrutinizing the explicit terms of an arbitration
agreement is a misinterpretation of Concepcion's holding. As subsequent cases
show, when manifestly unfair terms serve to rob an arbitration agreement of its
basic expectations, it is difficult to show true consent ever existed in the first
place. Whether these post-Concepcion decisions hold up to Supreme Court scruti-
ny is unknown, but a sweeping look at the long history of the FAA and the Su-
preme Court's treatment of it suggests they will.
SHANE BLANK
the parties and, as such, must be upheld where it does not promote a manifest injustice to the Concep-
cions or pervert the objectives of the FAA so greatly as to warrant a justifiable exclusion of such term
being previously bargained for.
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